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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ST ATE AUTOMOBILE AND
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
RICHARD J. SALISBURY and
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
AGENCY. a Utah corporation,

Case No.
12511

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by an insurer against its agent
for damages resulting from the agent's breach of his
duties to insurer in binding a risk.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was first tried to a jury in September
of 1970. That jury returned a unanimous general ver. .
<lict in favor of State Auto and against Diversified In ...
sruance Company upon which judgment was entered.
( R-99. 103). Defendant Richard J. Salisbury had ear ...
lier stipulated out of the case. Upon motion of Diversi-
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fled judgment was set aside and a new trial granted
( R. 106). In the second trial in April of 1971 another
jury unanimously found in favor of State Auto upon
a special verdict. ( R. 150). Judgment was again entered in favor of State Auto and against Diversified
whose motion for a new trial was denied. ( R. 157, 158,
169).
In the first trial the key instruction of the court
to the jury was number 13:
"Before you can return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the prohibitive list, Exhibit 2-P,
was received by defendant or that the defendant
knew of said list, or that it should have known
of said list in the use of reasonable care prior to
the time it bound coverage on Farrell-Crawforth." ( R. 70)
The first jury obviously found this proposition to be
true.
In the second trial the jury was unable to determine whether defendant received a 1964 edition of
the prohibitive list or whether it violated "underwriting
guides." However that jury did find that:
"Prior to October 1, 1965, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant (Diversified) had enough
notice to require the defendant (Diversified) to inquire
about the prohibition of insuring applicants with two
moving violations within three years." ( R. 149, 150;
Proposition Number 2 of Special Verdict).
The court thereafter found that Diversified would
have been instructed not to bind coverage on Farrell
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Crawforth if Diversified had made inquiry of State
Auto and that State Auto reasonably and necessarily
incurred a loss in a stipulated amount as a proximate
result of Diversified' s negligence. ( R. 153, 154, 180,
271).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Diversified' s Statement of Facts requires correc,..
tion and supplement. (All emphasis by Respondent.)
The sales agency agreement between State Auto
and Diversified entered into on July 10, 1964 provided:
'' . . . (Diversified) shall not bind or obligate ...
(State Auto) ... in any manner whatsoever except as
herein specifically provided, or, as defined in the man ...
uals and underwriting guide ( s)."
" (Diversified may bind coverage on risks usually
written and authorized by (State Auto) with the fol ...
lowing exceptions and limitations:

*

*

*

5. (Diversified) shall not have binding authority
as respects any risk prohibited by the underwriting
guide ( s) or the rate manual, or included within the
prohibited list thereof." (Exhibit 1... p)
Before Diversified sumbitted the Crawforth appli ...
cation on October 1, 1965, a series of applications sub ...
mitted by Diversified were rejected by State Auto as
the following correspondence from State Auto to Di...
versified illustrates:
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On February 22:
"We are returning the application to you ... it is
indicated that the applicant has had two violations in
the past two years. Also, there have been two accidents
in the past three years. Although the applicant was not
at fault, we do not feel we would want to provide coverage on the basis of the frequency of these occurrences." (Exhibit 6-P, R. 213, 214.)
On August 18, 1965:
"It is noted that the wife has been involved in
three accidents in the last three years. Although two of
these appear to be not at fault, the third one is clearly
an at fault accident. However, in view of the other two,
it would appear that this applicant's wife is somewhat
accident prone. On the basis of this, we feel it would
be best to decline coverage and return the application
to you." (Exhibit 10-P, R. 218.)
On August 30, 1965:
"We are returning the application to you ... We
are not permitted to write any vehicles over fifteen
years of age ... In addition, the applicant has had one

accident and two violations in the past three years. We
do not care to write any risk who has had two or more
accidents or violations within that period of time."
(Exhibit 11-P, R. 223, 224.)

On September 13, 1965:
"It is noted that this insured son is the principal
operator of these units and in view of the fact that he
is under twenty-five years of age, we do not feel that
we would care to write this risk. This is especially true
since he has had two speeding violations in the last
three years." (Exhibit 15-P, R. 227.)
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On September 13, 1965:
''We are returning the application to you ... in
view of the fact that we are dealing with underage operators and a sports car, we feel that we would not
care to provide coverage. It is also noted that the applicant has had two violations in the last two years.
This would also put the risk on our prohibited list.'
(Exhibit 14-P, R. 229, 230.)
There is absolutely no evidence or indication that
State Auto had ever accepted these types of risks from
Salisbury or Diversified.
Salisbury was the president and acting executive
of Diversified and had 11 years experience in insurance ( R. 184, 235, 236.)
Salisbury knew Crawforth "very well" and had
handled his insurance for some time ( R. 202, 31, 32.)
Up until the fall of 1965 Salisbury had provided
coverage for Crawforth through Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. Salisbury and Diversified did considerable business with Fireman's Fund, but little business with State Auto ( R. 322, 291.)
Craw forth had a number of moving violations
known to Salisbury ( R. 29. )
Crawforth had been delinquent in payment of
some premiums ( R. 204.)
Mr. Terry. a representative of Fireman's Fund,
firmly discussed with Salisbury that Fireman's Fund
would be "getting off the ( Crawforth) risk" and de..clining to renew the risk ( R. 322, 314, 316, 317.)
Fireman's Fund terminated Crawforth' s coverage
because Crawforth became ineligible with that company ( R. 138.) Craw forth' s driving record would have
made him ineligible with Fireman's Fund ( R. 311,
312.)
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At all times pertinent, the prohibited list of State
Auto specifically forbade Salisbury and Diversified to
bind any coverage for "anyone who has had insurance refused or cancelled" (Ex. 22d, R. 237-9.)
Upon this background, on October l, 1965 Salisbury prepared a binding application bearing the signatures of Salisbury and Crawforth, reciting that Crawforth had not had any insurance declined, cancelled or
renewal request declined (Ex. 23d R. 324.)
When the application was received by State Auto
in Denver it was rejected and a letter confirming the
rejection was mailed on October 15, 1965 by State
Auto from its Denver office to Diversified. ( Exs. 16P and 18-P, R. 210.)
Crawforth was involved in an accident on October 16 and immediately ( 2 a.m.) got word to Salisbury
about the accident. ( R. 207.) On October 16 Salisbury wrote to State Auto asking that a policy be issued
as soon as possible, Salisbury slyly withholding any
mention of Craw forth' s accident as follows:
October 16, 1965
Gentlemen:

Re: Application:
Farrel Crawforth

A policy was ordered on this some time ago and we
have not yet received it. We are wondering at the delay and would appreciate it very much if you would
see that the policy is issued as soon as possible. Many
thanks.
Yours very truly,
Diversified Insurance Agency
Richard J. Salisbury''
(Ex. 179, R. 208.)
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Ultimately, State Auto protected the interests of
Crawforth and others involved in the accident,
pending in excess of $19,000 in so doing, after
ing Diversified that reimbursement would be sought.
( Exh. 20 P.) The parties stipulated that such action
on the part of State Auto was reasonable and
sary on the part of State Auto ( R. 210, 211.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
low.

Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN INSURANCE AGENT MUST ACT
GENTLY, REASONABLY, AND WITH DUE
CARE IN THE INTEREST OF HIS PRINCIPAL.
The Restatement of Agency, Section 379 at page
838 states:
"Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject
to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and
with the skill which is standard in the locality for the
kind of work which he is employed to perform and, in
addition, to exercise any special skill that he has."
In summarizing the duties of an agent to his
surer, 35 ALR 3rd, 911 and 912 states:
"It has been established by the authority of many
cases that an insurance agent owes to his principal the
obligation of high fidelity, that he may not proceed
without or beyond his authority, particularly where his
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instructions have forbidden him to act in assuming risks
on behalf of the insurer, and that if his actions in issuing a policy in violation of this actual authority cause
loss to the insurer, he is fully accountable therefore.

*

*

*

"The relationship between an insurance agent and
his insurer is controlled basically by the law of agency,
a fundamental principal of which is that the agent must
obey all reasonable instructions and directions in regard to the manner of performing a service that he has
contracted to perform and must exercise reasonable
and diligent care in carrying out his orders."
Diversified implies in its brief that its only duty
was to exercise good faith and discretion. Diversified
made no request for any such instruction to the jury.
( R. 124-132). In any event, Diversified was under a
duty to not only exercise good faith but also reasonable
skill and care.
The duty of an agent is well explained in Gardenhire v. Phoenix Title, 466 P.2d 776, at 778 (Ariz.
1970):
"The general agency r u I e is that if an
agent's authorization is ambiguous, he may act
with good faith and escape responsibility if he
misinterprets his principal' s actual intent. 3 Am.
Jur.2d Agency §206; 3 C.J.S. Agency § 148.
However, we point out that this rule, as spelled
out in the Restatement of Agency, Second §44,
states that the agent may so act in good faith
and with safety only if the ambiguity is because
of facts of which he has no notice. However, it
points out:
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' ... If, at the time of acting, the agent
should realize the possibility of conflicting inter-pretations, ordinarily he is not authorized to
act, since it would be his duty to communicate
with the principal and obtain more definite in-structions.' "
A case squarely in favor of State Auto on the
proposition is United States Liability Ins. v. Haidinger-H ayes, Inc., 463 P .2d 770 (Calif. 1970) where the
judgement in favor of an insurer against his agent for
the failure of the latter to exercise due care was af-firmed by the California Supreme Court. In that case,
the insurer suffered losses by the failure of the agent
to make proper investigation before issuing an insur-ance policy. The court stated at 773:
'' ... defendants owed a duty to plaintiff to ex-ercise reasonable care in handling plaintiff's bus-iness and, in the investigation and underwriting
of each insurance risk, to also make a reason-able effort to produce a profit for plaintiff."
Speaking of the agent the court stated:
"He anticipated a reduction in the loss picture
through his better efficiency in handling claims,
but he did not inquire as to the facts of prior
claims or the costs of defending them."
See also: St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Com-pany v. Laubenstein, 155 N.W. 918. (Wisc. 1916).
In Oxford Lakeline v. First National Bank, 24
So. 480, the court stated at p. 483:
"It is the privilege of the principal to give instruc-tions, and the duty of his agent is to obey them. Any
unauthorized deviation from or neglect of the princi-pal' s instructions, whereby damage results, will entitle
him to an action against the agent, even though the lat--
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ter, in deviating from or neglecting to obey instructions, acted in good faith, and honestly believed he
was acting for the best interest of his principal." See
also Gulf Insurance v. Kolob, 404 F.2d 115 (10th Cir.
1968-Utah; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 56 P.2d 305
(Ore. 1936); Couch On Insurance 2d, 350, p. 298;
Mecham on Agency, Paragraphs 474-477.
In Canada Steamship v. Inland Waterways, 166
F.2d 57, (5th Cir. 1948) the court held that the duty
of fidelity to the principal' s interest obligated the
agent to obtain more precise instructions if he was uncertain as to how best to serve the principal's interest.
The court stated:
" ... Where, as here, an agent has been given
general instructions to clear a shipment, which instructions could be carried out in the interests of the principal without incurring duty, if the agent, without returning for more specific instructions, assumes to take
a course in carrying the instructions out which subjects
the shipment to duty, the agent, not the principal must
bear the loss. In short, whereas here, plaintiff had not
given defendant specific authority to incur and pay
duty, but had merely given a general instruction to
clear the shipment and one construction would be
greatly to the principal' s injury, must be held liable
for the loss sustained. This is because the duty of
fidelity to the principal' s interest, the prime duty of
an agent, obligated him to act, under the instructions,
in and not against plaintiff's interests, and ... if defendant was uncertain as to how best to serve those inter'"'
ests, he should have delayed the action until, informing
the plaintiff of his uncertainty, he had obtained more
precise and special instructions."
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In summary, an agent is bound to exercise the ut,....
most in good faith, loyalty, diligence and reasonable
care in the affairs of his principal. If the agent fails to
exercise this kind of care and the principal suffers a
loss, the agent may be held responsible. Although an
insurance agent may, within his apparent or ostensible
authority, bind an insurance company to a risk which
the company usually declines and which his instruc,....
tions or reasonable care forbid him i:o do, the agent is
liable to the company for losses it incurs by virtue of
the binder or policy. 3 CJS Agency, § 147; Restatement
of Agency, 2d §383, 138, 155, 149; 43 Am. fur. 2d,
Insurance§ 169.
The case of Crawforth v. DiMicco, 215 So. 2d
769 ( Fla. 1968) is instructive. There the insurer had
advised the agent on a prior occasion that a "survey"
was required on boats before coverage could be bound.
Subsequently, the agent bound coverage on another
boat without obtaining a survey. On appeal the trial
court's judgment for the agent was reversed, and the
court directed judgment of indemnity in favor of the
insurer as a matter of law, stating:
"The testimony reveals vividly that the
agency's employee admittedly and grievously
breached his duty to the insurer by his initial
unauthorized act in binding the vessel ... "
In the instant case, Salisbury has not disputed
that he received the various communications from State
Auto instructing him that State Auto did not want cer,....
tain risks.

12
POINT II
IT IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER AN AGENT BREACHES HIS DUTY.
Ordinarily the relationship of principal and agent
and their proper course of dealing is a question of fact.
See United States Liability Ins. v. Haidinger, Supra. at
774; Eckhardt v. Greeley National Bank, 245 P. 710
(Colo. 1926); Glassman v. Phoenix Insurance, 160
S.E. 2d, 264 (Ga. 1968); Gulf Ins. v. Kolob, Supra.
In Blackshire Manufacturing Company v. Umatila Fruit Company, 48 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1931) there
was an allegation that a salesman was guilty of negligence and bad faith in extending credit on behalf of
his principal. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to present a question for the jury although there
was no evidence of a direct breach in the express or
implied terms of the agency contract. In reversing the
directed verdict for the defendant, the court stated:
"Want of diligence or bad faith might well
have been considered established by the jury,
with consequent loss and damage to the plaintiff. The law exacts that every agent employ
diligence, good faith, and obedience to instructions in the execution of his agency or employment and holds him liable for failure therein that
occasions damage."
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POINT III
DIVERSIFIED DID BREACH ITS DUTY TO
STATE AUTO.
When State Auto engaged Diversified and Salisbury as agents, they were authorized to bind coverage on risks usually written by State Auto. In amplification of that authority, State Auto set forth in communications to Diversified from time to time instructions pertaining to risks which it would usually underwrite. Some of these instructions were set forth in the
"rate" manual, on prohibited lists, in memos and correspondence which came from State Auto to Diversified.
State Auto introduced evidence that in 1964, State
Auto decided to become increasingly restrictive in its
automobile underwriting because of a poor loss ratio.
( R. 304) State Auto adopted an expanded "1964"
prohibitive list, published the same, and in the normal
routine of communications disseminated such information to its agents. (See Exs. 5-P, 2-A, 2-P, and 21;
Testimony of Elwood Johnson at R. 282-305; and Elsie Waggoner at R. 245-270, 276-281.) Salisbury testified that he had no recollection of receiving any
information on the 1964 prohibitive list, but that it was
"possible" he did ( R. 231, 232.) His testimony at the
first trial was even more vascillating ( R. 339, 341.)
The jury at the first trial in September 1970 by its verdict necessarily found that the prohibited list of 1964
was known to Diversified before Craw forth' s application was submitted. At the second trial in April 1971,
a nervous Mrs. Waggoner, State Auto's mail clerk,
had even more difficulty attempting to reconstruct her
mailings of the 1964 prohibitive list she claimed to have
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made to Diversified in 1964. Thus, it is not surprising
that the second jury, over 6 years after the event, could
not determine whether or not Diversified received a
1964 prohibitive list before the Crawforth application.
State Auto does not contend that it is an established
fact that Diversified received the 1964 prohibitive list.
However, State Auto does contend that the background of such testimony and evidence is relevant to
an understanding of the record and decisions made in
the lower court.

It is noteworthy that of the many communications

that passed between Diversified and State Auto the
only information which State Auto transmitted which
Diversified claimed it did not receive. was that pertaining to the 1964 prohibitive list. ( R. 199.)
Crawforth was an
risk. Salisbury
acknowledged that he had collection problems with
Crawforth. ( 204.) The testimony of Mr. Terry from
Fireman's Fund that Crawforth was ineligible for continuation of coverage with Fireman's Fund because of
his driving record was unimpeached. ( R. 309-312.)
Terry talked firmly to Salisbury about "getting off the
risk." (R. 315, 316, 317, 322.)
The Fireman's Fund policy was less expensive
than the State Auto policy ( R. 314.) Salisbury wrote
only a small amount of business with State Auto. He
had 10 or 11 other companies where he placed most of
his business. (R. 186, 187, 188, 190, 202, 291.) Salisbury recognized that State Auto was a "preferred"
company that sought selected risks for lower rates ( R.
201.) Salisbury acknowledged that normally coverage
changes were anticipated in advance. ( R. 205, 206.)
Terry's testimony was unimpeached that notice went

15
to Diversified and Salisbury of the termination of
Crawforth's coverage with Fireman's Fund in advance
of the termination date. (R. 309-317.) Salisbury apparently had left himself no time to make further inquiry because he bound coverage on October 1, 1965,
the date he made up the application and sent it on to
State Auto. ( R. 206) Salisbury was under pressure to
protect himself and Crawforth and "dumped" the coverage on State Auto. There is no other plausible explanation for Salisbury acting so contrary to the
instructions and advices he specifically received from
State Auto in August and September of 1965 when
State Auto rejected the same, if not more desirable,
type risks.
Could Salisbury receive two letters from State
Auto in the middle of September 1965, advising him
that State Auto did not want to provide coverage for
applicants with two violations within the past two or
three year period, that the same were on the prohibited
list, and then turn around and think that he could be
following the instructions or interests of the company
by submitting a nonbinding application, let alone a
binding application, on such a risk? Two juries thought
not.
Salisbury's inconsistency was evident from his
testimony:
(Mr. Jensen) In other words, if you re ...
ceived a communication from State Auto ...
mobile to you about underwriting rules and
the kind of risks they wanted and didn't
want, you would feel obligated to follow that direction
from them, is that right?

"Q.

A.

(Mr. Salisbury) Yes. I think that's a fair
statement.
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Q.

And if State Auto had said to you in writing
or otherwise, 'Mr. Salisbury, Diversified,
we don't want drivers - we' re not prepared to assume the risk of insuring the
drivers who have record of two or more
moving violations in a three year period.'
You would have felt it was your duty not
to submit at least a binding application to
the company on that kind of a risk, is that
true?
A. Yes. (R. 198.)

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

*

*

*

In other words, let's say this comes in the
office, 6P, you have got it in front of you
and the company says they don't want Mr.
Riley because of this kind of a record, and
a fellow comes in and says, 'well, I've got
a record of three violations and - but I
need coverage right now, Mr. Salisbury,
can you bind me?' Would you then purport
to bind this company?
One of the things you do in this business is
you have some black and white rules that
you follow and then you try to second guess
the underwriters' feelings and how he feels
about a particular case, and if it doesn't go
against the black and white rule then you
send it to him because he may very well
accept it that day. ( R. 214, 215.)

*

*

*

So my question is: Weren't you clearly go-ing contrary to all the indications the com-pany had given you in writing in 1965 with-out (sic) this type of risk?
Not necessarily ... ( R. 232.)
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Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

OK. So the prohibited list of risks is just
notice to you, isn't it, from State Auto: 'we
don't want these risks,' isn't that right?
I don't that.

I think there is no question about

What's the difference between that and the
letter from the underwriter that says, 'we
don't want this risk', this type of risk?
I think it's a matter of law as the question.
I mean, you know, you're the attorney here,
and I have agreed with you that if I have
another indication from an underwriter, that
the next time that I am unaware of that in ...
dication I'm not going to send something
into them ....
And would you feel that you had a right to
bind the company to a risk that you knew
they didn't want?

If we were aware of it -

but that has noth...
ing to do with the binding powers is what
I tried to point out." ( R. 222, 223.)

*

*

*

So sure you might send an application in to
leave the company free where they are not
obligated because of any act you made. In
binding them you would not bind someone
like that would you?

A.

Like which? Now you have mentioned a
couple of cases.

A.

I'm talking about someone who comes in
on the day you received this letter rejecting
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Mr. White, and this person says, 'I've got
three moving violations in three years,· or
even two in three years, 'can you cover me?'
A.

Q.

A.

Well, I would have to answer that question
similar to the way I answered it before ...
I would feel, if I had a feeling for what the
underwriter would do - certainly I would
not send him an application that he would
reject. I still feel that the legality of being
able to bind or not bind is outside of the what's taking place here ...
You wouldn't bind someone with three moving violations to State Auto in view of that
letter, would you?
Well, I'm not really sure . . . . (R. 225,
226.)

State Auto contends that as a matter of law and
fact Salisbury and hence Diversified clearly did not act
in the interest of their principal, but unreasonably and
in utter disregard of clear and reitterated instructions.
Salisbury had no authority to bind any risk which
a reputable agent, exercising reasonable judgment,
would not bind.
Salisbury's breach of his duty to State Auto was
evident to two unanimous juries.
At the very least, Salisbury was under an obliga-tion to submit the application in nonbinding form if
not to pick up the phone or write a letter inquiring as
to whether there were any posibilities that Crawforth' s
application would be acceptable to the company be-cause of the personal friendship that Salisbury had
with Craw forth. (See EX. 13--P and 12-P. )
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POINT IV
ESTOPPEL IS NOT A PROPER ISSUE ON APPEAL.
Although Diversified asserted estoppel as a defense ( R. 5-8) and requested an instruction to the jury
thereon ( R. 130), Diversified did not off er any evidence on the issue and did not take exception to the
refusal of the trial court to give any such instruction
( R. 345-34 7), and could not press the issue in its
motion for new trial ( R. 157-158). Diversified should,
therefore, not be allowed to raise the issue on appeal.
See Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Beck
v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co. 2 Utah 2d 104, 269
P. 2d 867. There are also no unusual circumstances to
justify the consideration of the issue on appeal according to William v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d
166. A defense, not supported by evidence nor made
the subject of an assignment of error, should not be
considered on appeal. Shaver Forwarding Co. v. Eagle
Star Ins. Co., 162 P.2d 789, 792. (Or. 1945.)
In attempting to extract from the record evidence
to support the estoppel contention, Diversified quotes
briefly from cross-examination where the agent for
State Auto admitted that State Auto had accepted unusual risks before. Diversified's point is that having
accepted unusual risks on occasion, State Auto lulled
Diversified into submitting unusual risks to its preju..
dice. However, a full examination of the testimony
shows unmistakably that such occasional references
pertained to non-binding applications only:

Q.

(Mr. Berry) And you also understood that
he had a right to submit risks to you, even
though he couldn't bind you on them?
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A.

(Mr. Johnson) That is right.

Q.

And you hoped to be able, in some instances,
at least, to affect the coverage when they
were submitted on a non-binding basis?

A.

We felt that if he put his own name on the
line, so to speak, that he recommended it,
that at least we could consider it, we should
consider it.

*

*

*

Q.

And the same if someone had two or more
violations in the last two years, if there were
some special circumstances to indicate the
driver was nut at fault, or the violations were
very minor. you might, in special circumstances accept that risk?

A.

Only after a complete review of the risk and
the extenuating circumstances in behalf of
it.

Q.

But you in some instances did take a risk like
that?

A.

Wehave.

Q.

And you wouldn't intend, by any correspondence or anything of that type. from precluding the agent to submit that type of risk
to you?

A.

No, sir.

MR. BERRY: That is all I have, your Honor. ( R.
301-302.)
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Jensen:
Q.

A.

Mr. Berry's last question was whether there
was anything that prevented the agent of a
company, like Mr. Salisbury of Diversified,
sending in an application for coverage of
somebody that was on, say, the prohibited
list of risks. That was the way he asked
the question. You indicated there was nothing to prevent him from sending in an application. Do you have reference to a binding application or a non-binding application
in that situation?
Non-binding application."

Defendant complains of delay between the time
the application was submitted and the time that State
Auto declined the policy.
Mere delay in repudiating is not enough, unless
the principal "with full knowledge of all the applicable
facts, waived the breach of his instructions to the
principal and adopted the agent's act as his own."
Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company v. Martin-Libreton Insurance Agency, 242 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1957). In the case just cited the insurance agency argued before the lower court that the insurance company "owed it a duty to disavow its actions immediately if the insurer intends to do so in order that the
agency could seek another bond to substitute for the
one in suit". The lower court found "that the agent
had acted in good faith, that the insurer had not ac-cepted promptly enough to disavow the agent's author-
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ity to act, and that, through its inaction, it had
prejudiced the position of its agents and was, therefore, estopped to make any claim over against the
agent for the loss on its bond." The appellant court
stated, however:
"We cannot agree with these views. The
law is well settled: That an agent owes to his
principal the obligation of high fidelity; that he
may not proceed without, or beyond his authority, particularly where he has been forbidden to
act; and that, if so proceeding, his actions cause
loss to the principal, the agent is fully accountable to the principal therefore.''
In American Fire 6 Marine v. Seymour, 144 So.
775 ( 1932), in a case which involved also an insurer's
suit against its agent for insuring an unacceptable risk
to the company the court refused to estop the insurance company and stated:
"It is well settled that the law does not
favor estoppels ... to hold otherwise would be
equal to approving the plea of estoppel against
the consequence of ones own wrong doing, a
thing that is abhorrent to all the rules of principle and equity."
Nine working days after receiving the Craw forth
application, State Auto mailed its rejection to Diversified. Prior to this time Diversified did not complain
of any delay on the part of State Auto in acting on the
application until October 16, a few hours after Salisbury knew of the accident and requested coverage but
withheld disclosure of the accident.
Diversified' s reference to State Auto's answer to
interrogatories, in which State Auto stated that it did
not establish a "daily" on the Craw forth application
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( R. 15), in no way suggests that there was no "diary"
or normal processing of the application by State Auto.
The term "Daily" was never explained, because the
subject was never gone into at trial by Diversified. The
answer to interrogatory was never introduced into
evidence.

Estoppel is a doctrine in equity, 28 Am fur 2d, §
26 at 625. Diversified should be precluded from assert-ing estoppel against State Auto on the basis of Diversi-fied' sown conduct under the circumstances.
Diversified failed to introduce any evidence as to
the reasonableness of State Auto's processing of the
Craw forth application or as to any reliance or prejudice
on the part of Diversified, other than counsel's gratuitous and unsubstantiated assumptions that estoppel
criucmstances prevailed. Diversified' s failure to carry
such an evidentiary burden, or to in any way permit the
lower court to reconsider the matter, should bar any
belated effort at this point.

POINT V
THE L 0 WE R COURT'S JUDGMENT IS
WITHOUT ERROR AND NOT SUBJECT TO
ANY ATTACK BY APPELLANT.
Diversified complains of the court's instruction
9-1 ( R. 144.) Such instruction was requested by Di-versified ( R. 128.) Although State Auto took exception to the instruction on the ground that it "may be
somewhat confusing to the jury" to the prejudice of
State Auto. ( R. 345), Diversified took no exception

24
to the instruction because it was obviously not prejudicial to Diversified. In any event, the jury was not
confused; they discerned that the court's instruction
9 ..1 was pertinent only to Proposition No. 1 and had no
application to Propositions 2 or 3 of the special verdict.
Diversified has taken the position that it was free
in its relationship with State Auto to bind any risks
which State Auto did not specifically forbid it to write
and that any such limitation had to be spelled out in a
prohibited list or underwriting guide received by Diversified.
State Auto asserts that Diversified, in the course
of its general and implied duties to exercise reasonable
care and diligence, was proscribed from binding other
than usual risks or ignoring instructions of State Auto
whether in the form of prohibited lists, underwriting
guides, letters, memos or word of mouth. The lower
court and juries concurred in the latter analysis.
Nor should Diversified be permitted to claim any
prejudice in a lack of instructions on the reasonable
care issues in Proposition No. 2 when Diversified re ..
sisted such instructions tendered by State Auto ( R.
122, 123.) In any event the terms reasonable care in
Proposition 2 were obviously susceptible of ready un,.
derstanding by ordinary jurors.
The parties have had more than ample opportun..
ity to fully and fairly present evidence and argument
to the jury and lower court which from their advan,.
taged positions have respectively made their findings
and conclusions. There is no error of any substance
or prejudice to Diversified. The verdict and judgment
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are rightly entitled to presumptions in favor of their
validity. Hales v. Peterson, 11 U.2d 411, 360 P .2d
822; Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 U.2d 261, 409 P.2d
121; Thompson v. Van Wagenen, 25 U.2d 381, 483
P.2d 427.
The court properly entered judgment for State
Auto.
CONCLUSION
Diversified was under a duty to bind only those
risks usually accepted by State Auto. Diversified was
under a duty to exercise diligence, reasonable care and
good faith in binding State Auto to any risk. Diversi.fied breached those duties as a matter of law and as a
matter of fact, contrary to the numerous instructions
and rejections of previous applications similar to the
Crawf orth application.
There is no evidence that State Auto failed to
act with reasonable promptness in handling the Craw..forth application, or that there was any reliance by or
prejudice to Diversified. The court did not submit any
such issues to the jury and Diversified did not take
exception thereto.
Diversified has had its day in court, twice. The
judgment in favor of State Auto against Diversified
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Jay E. Jensen of
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

